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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LAWYER ADVERTISING IN OKLAHOMA
AFTER IN RE R.M.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re R.M.J ,
during the past term, has again brought into question the extent to
which a state may regulate lawyer advertising.2 In a unanimous deci-
sion, the Court declared unconstitutional several provisions of the Mis-
souri Code of Professional Responsibility3 which regulate the method
and extent of lawyer advertising in Missouri. Because the Oklahoma
rules on lawyer advertising are similar in nature to those of Missouri,4
1. 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
2. Each state adopts its own Code of Professional Responsibility to regulate attorney con-
duct. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 13 (1981). Prior to 1977, most states prohibited all forms of
lawyer advertising. However, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (5-4 decision),
the United States Supreme Court ruled that states could not prohibit all lawyer advertising. See
infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
3. Mo. ANN. RULEs Rule 4 (Vernon 1981). The specific sections of the Missouri Code of
Professional Responsibility that were struck down are:
DR 2-101. Publicity
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential con-
sumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish, subject to DR 2-103, the following infor-
mation ... presented in a dignified manner:
(2) One or more particular areas or fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm prac-
tices if authorized by and using designations and definitions authorized for that purpose
by the Advisory Committee;
DR 2-102. Professional Notices, Letterheads, and Offices, and Law Lists
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use professional cards, professional announcement
cards, office signs, letterheads, or similar professional notices or devices, except that the
following may be used if they are in dignified form:
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associations or ad-
dresses, change of firm name, or similar matters pertaining to the professional offices of a
lawyer or law firm, which may be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends, and relatives ....
Id.
4. Oklahoma Code of Professional Responsibility, OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3 (1981).
The specific sections of the Oklahoma Code that are similar to Missouri are:
1
Babb: Lawyer Advertising in Oklahoma after In Re R.M.J.
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
1982] LAWER ADVERTISING IN OKLAHOMA
this decision could have a significant effect on the constitutionality of
the Oklahoma provisions. In fact, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
taken notice of In re R.M.J in its recent decision in State ex rel
Oklahoma Bar Association v. Schaffer.' This Recent Development will
discuss the probable effect of In Re RM.J on the extent to which a
state may regulate lawyer advertising and will recommend steps
Oklahoma should take to bring its rules into constitutional compliance.
II. HISTORY
The desirability and advisability of lawyer advertising has histori-
cally provoked a heated debate within the legal profession. On one end
DR 2-101. Publicity
(B) In order to promote the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential con-
sumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish, subject to DR 2-103, the following infor-
mation... in a professional and dignified manner:.
(8) until permitted by the rules of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma a lawyer shall not
include in an advertisement
(a) a statement of one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm con-
centrates, or a statement that the practice is limited to one or more fields of law;
(b) a statement that the lawyer or law firm engages in the general practice of law;
(c) a statement indicating one or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm
does not practice;
(d) a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law
practice. (See DR 2-105)
DR 2-102. Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices, and Law Lists
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or participate in the use of professional cards,
professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, law lists, legal directory list-
ings, or similar professional notices or devices, except that the following may be used if
they are in dignified form:
(2) A brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associations or ad-
dresses, change of firm name, or similar matters pertaining to the professional offices of a
lawyer or law firm, which may be mailed to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends, and relatives.
DR 2-105. Limitation of Practice
(A) A lawyer shall not hold himself out publicly as a specialist as practicing in certain
areas of law or as limiting his practice as permitted under DR 2-101(B) and DR 2-
102(A), except as follows:
(4) A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the lawyer or the law firm
practices or states that his practice is limited to one or more fields of law shall do so by
using designations and definitions authorized and approved by the Supreme Court of the
State of Oklahoma.
Id.
5. 53 OKLA. B.J. 1761 (1982). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 32-37 and accom-
panying text.
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of the spectrum are members of the bar who argue that advertising by
lawyers is not only an economic necessity for young lawyers,6 but also
that the general public benefits from the advertising.' In opposition,
others assert that advertising is unnecessary and its use demeaning to
the legal profession.'
These arguments remained theoretical until the 1977 Supreme
Court decision in Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,9 which struck down the
traditional ban'0 on lawyer advertising." Since the Bates decision
made advertising constitutionally permissible, lawyers have begun to
experiment in increasing numbers.' 2 The American Bar Association
responded to Bates by amending the Code of Professional Responsibil-
6. See Andrews, The Selling of a Precedent, 10 STUDENT LAW., Mar. 1982, at 12. Many
young lawyers fresh out of law school feel that the only way they can "hang their shingle" and be
successful is to advertise. In California, for example, there is one lawyer for every 365 persons.
Id. at 11. Nationwide, there are 129 schools of law graduating approximately 60,000 students
yearly. .d. at 12. Oklahoma ranks sixth in the nation in lawyer-population ratio with one lawyer
for every 322 persons. 68 A.B.A. J. 898 (1982).
7. For example, advertising by a lawyer is said to reduce the cost of legal services due to
increased volume. News in Brief, 49 U.S.L.W. 2285, 2286 (1980).
8. Stamper, Remarks at Panel on Advertising, 49 OKLA. B.J. 459 (1978).
I think the proper practice of the law is too personal, too important to those who
need legal advice and representation, to be sold and dispensed like breakfast food and
dry cleaning.
May it be said of us, when we file our last briefs and go to the great Courtroom in
the sky, that we did a lot of business, but that we loved our profession, and those who
honorably practiced it, and didn't help the legal profession become the legal services
industry.
We can alleviate any need for advertising if we follow, and Oklahoma is doing a
splendid job, that portion of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says:
"We are to educate laymen to recognize their problems, to facilitate the intelligent
selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available."
Id. at 462. But see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). Freed-
man takes issue with those who object that lawyer advertising would "degrade the profession."
He asserts that, "A common justification for such rules is that advertising would lead to abuses
such as false and misleading claims. Why lawyers would be more prone to engage in that kind of
dishonesty, however, than are sellers of other services or commodities has never been articulated."
Id. at 114.
9. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
10. In AM..f, the Court noted that "many of the states, until the decision in Bates....
placed an absolute prohibition on advertising by lawyers." 102 S. Ct. at 932.
11. Because of the sharp division in the profession as to lawyer advertising, the decision in
Bates sent shock waves through the legal community. See Stamper, supra note 8, at 459.
12. Andrews, supra note 6, at 12.
According to American Bar Association statistics, the number of lawyers who advertise
has increased. . . since 1977. A 1978 survey of ABA attorneys. . . showed 3 percent of
them advertised. The following year, a similar random survey found that figure to be 7
percent. In the most recent poll, reported in December 1981, 10 percent of ABA lawyers
said they advertise.
3
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ity to comply with the requirements set forth in the decision.' 3 Several
states, including Missouri and Oklahoma, amended their Codes of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in substantial conformity with the ABA
amendments. 14
As the states were re-writing their codes, the Supreme Court, in
1978, handed down two decisions which further insulated lawyer ad-
vertising from disciplinary action.15  .M..J may again require the
states to reconsider their restrictions on lawyer advertising.
13. Prior to the Bates decision, the ABA created a Task Force on Lawyer Advertising which
developed two proposals on lawyer advertising. The Task Force described the proposals as:
Proposal A may be described as "regulatory." It would specifically authorize cer-
tain prescribed forms of lawyer advertising if approved by state authorities. It would
seek in advance to channel commercial announcements but would rely on "after the
fact" enforcement to discipline persons violating the regulation ....
In contrast, Proposal B may be termed "directive." It would allow publication of all
information not "false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive" and provides guidelines for
determination of improper advertisements, which would be subject to "after the fact"
discipline by state authorities.
Both proposals are constructive responses to the goal recognized by the Supreme
Court of providing consumers with needed information about lawyer services and their
costs.
63 A.B.A. J. 1234 (1977). The ABA Board of Governors recommended and the House of Dele-
gates adopted Proposal A. Id.
14. In early 1978, "[o]n careful consideration of. . .Bates," the Oklahoma Supreme Court
amended Canon 2 of the Oklahoma Code of Professional Responsibility. In Re the Adoption of
Amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Oklahoma Bar Association, 49
OKLA. B.J. 130 (1978).
15. Figa, Lawyer Solicitation Today and Under the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 393, 398 (1981). The two cases decided, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), represented the extremes of
solicitation by lawyers which the Supreme Court will sanction. Unfortunately, Primus and
Ohralik were decided after Oklahoma and Missouri had adopted their new codes. Thus, the
import of these decisions is not reflected in the codes.
In Primus, an ACLU attorney contacted a potential client by letter in an attempt to represent
the client in an action against a doctor and the state. The potential client had agreed to a steriliza-
tion as a condition precedent to receiving Medicaid payments. The United States Supreme Court
rescinded the public reprimand issued by the South Carolina Supreme Court on the basis that this
was not an in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. 436 U.S. at 422.
In Ohralik, the attorney made an in-person solicitation of two young women who had been
involved in an automobile accident. One of the contacts was made while the woman was still in
the hospital; the other took place in the home of the other woman the day she was released from
the hospital. The Court affirmed the Ohio Supreme Court's indefinite suspension. 436 U.S. at
468.
In R.MJ, the Court affirmed its holding in Ohralik stating:
[T]he Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases that regulation-and imposi-
tion of discipline-are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to
deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has
in fact been deceptive. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,. . . the Court held that the
p ossibility of "fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of
exatious conduct'" was so likely in the context of in-person solicitation, that such solic-
itation could be prohibited.
102 S. Ct. at 937.
4
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF IN RE R.Mf.J
A. The Facts
R.M.J. graduated from law school and was admitted to the Mis-
souri and Illinois bars in 1973. In April of 1977, R.M.J. moved his law
practice to St. Louis, Missouri. To announce the opening of his office,
R.M.J. advertised in several local papers and the yellow pages. In ad-
dition, he mailed professional announcement cards to a selected list of
addresses.' 6 The contents of the advertisement, as well as the mailing,
resulted in disbarment proceedings against R.M.J. by the Select Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility.'
The proceedings were based upon three violations of the Missouri
Code of Professional Responsibility: (1) improper listing of areas of
concentration; (2) impermissible listing of jurisdictions in which R.M.J.
was licensed to practice; and (3) mailing office opening announcements
to unauthorized persons.' 8 Of the areas listed by R.M.J. in his an-
nouncements, four conformed to the rules, eleven deviated from the
rules, and eight areas were not expressly permitted by the rules.' 9
R.M.J. also advertised that he was licensed to practice in Missouri and
Illinois and that he had been admitted to practice before the United
States Supreme Court.20 The violations were compounded by the fact
that R.M.J. mailed announcements of the opening of his law office to
persons other than lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and
relatives.2'
The Supreme Court of Missouri found R.M.J. to be in violation of
16. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. at 934.
17. The Select Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility is charged with develop-
ing the areas of concentration as well as prosecuting disciplinary violations. See In re R.M.J., 609
S.W.2d 411, 411 (Mo. 1980) and 102 S. Ct. at 933 & n.5.
18. Mo. ANN. RULES Rule 4 (Vernon 1981).
19. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. at 933, 934 n.8. The four ads that conformed to the rules were:
"bankruptcy," "anti-trust," "labor," and "criminal." The eleven areas that deviated from the
rules were: "tax" instead of "taxation law"; "corporate" and "partnership" instead of "corpora-
tion law and business organizations"; "real estate" instead of "property law"; "probate" and
"wills, estate planning" instead of "probate and trust law"; "personal injury" instead of "tort law";
"trials & appeals" instead of "trial practice" and "appellate practice"; "workmen's compensation"
instead of "workers compensation law"; and "divorce-separation" and "custody-adoption" in-
stead of "family law." The eight areas that were listed by R.M.J. but were not authorized by the
Missouri Advisory Committee were: "contract," "aviation," "securities-bonds," "pension &
profit sharing plans," "zoning and land use," "entertainment/sports," "food, drug and cosmetic,"
and "communication." Id.
20. Interpretation of the Missouri Advisory rules, Mo. ANN. RULES Rule 4 (Vernon 1981),
reveals that no advertising is permitted except that type which is specifically allowed. Listing of
the states by which an attorney is licensed to practice is not included.
21. In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. at 938.
[Vol. 18:136
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the rules and chose to issue a private reprimand to R.M.J.2 2 R.M.J.
had urged the Missouri Court to apply the Central Hudson23 four-part
commercial speech test to lawyer advertising;24 however, the Missouri
Supreme Court, in deciding not to apply the test, stated:
We are urged now by respondent to follow the Central
Hudson model. We respectfully decline to enter the thicket of
attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc
judgments of a majority of the justices of the United States
Supreme Court ...
We recognize respondent's right to press on in the courts
authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution. If
he exercises that right and obtains a favorable result there, we
can then decide whether we will honor our duty to exercise
"superintending control over all courts" in Missouri. . . or
will order DR 2-101 excised from Rule 4 of this Court.
We are aware, of course, that this is a "test" case and that
respondent's violation of Missouri's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility is minimal. 25
Because the Missouri court recognized this as a test case, the justices
were unwilling to change their advertising guidelines until the Supreme
Court provided more guidance.26 Since the violation was minimal,
R.M.J. was privately reprimanded.
B. R.M.J. in the United States Supreme Court
In delivering the opinion for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell
found the advertisements by R.M.J. to be commercial speech and ap-
plied the Central Hudson test.27 He emphasized that, under this com-
mercial speech doctrine, "the States retain the authority to regulate
22. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980).
23. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
24. The Court set forth the test:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset,
we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
id. at 566.
25. In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d at 412 (emphasis in original).
26. Although lawyer advertising is regulated by each respective state, the regulations are sub-
ject to constitutional limitations as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
27. 102 S. Ct. at 937-38 & nn.15-16.
1982]
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advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proven to be mis-
leading in practice. There may be other substantial state interests as
well that will support carefully drawn restrictions."2
The Court first addressed the listing of areas of concentration by
R.M.J. None of the areas listed by R.M.J., including the deviations
and the prohibited listings, were found to be misleading. Nor did the
record reflect the promotion of any substantial state interest in restrict-
ing the specialty listings. Thus the Court concluded "that this portion
of [the rule] is an invalid restriction upon speech."2 9 The same was true
of the prohibition against the listing of the jurisdictions in which a law-
yer is licensed to practice.3 0
Turning to the problem of mailing "office opening announce-
ments" to unauthorized persons, the Court admitted that this type of
advertising may be more difficult to supervise. However, the Court
dealt "with a silent record. There is no indication that an inability to
supervise is the reason the state restricts the potential audience of an-
nouncement cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the
only solution.' ' s l Thus, the United States Supreme Court specifically
invalidated three controls on lawyer advertising that had been adopted
by Missouri.
IV. THE EFFECT IN OKLAHOMA
On July 14, 1982, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided State ex
rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Schaffer. 2 Peter K. Schaffer's legal
clinics had made two advertisements upon which the Oklahoma Bar
Association based its complaint.33 The Oklahoma Court, having the
28. Id. at 939.
29. Id. at 938.
30. Id. at 938-39. The Court did find troubling the statement, in large boldface type, that
R.M.J. was a member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court. "The emphasis of this
relatively uninformative fact is at least bad taste. Indeed, such a statement could be misleading to
the general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the bar of this Court. Yet
there is no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court." Id. at 939.
31. Id. The Court suggested that one alternative would be to require "a filing with the Advi-
sory Committee of a copy of all general mailings, [so] the State may be able to exercise reasonable
supervision over such mailings." Id. The Court also recognized another alternative proposed by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association, Rule 7.2(b) wherein,
"[a] copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for one year
after its dissemination." Id. at 939 n.19.
32. 53 OKLA. BJ. 1761 (1982).
33. Id. at 1762. These ads stated:
Advertisement #1:
"adopt: to love and cherish as your very own. Perhaps you already love and cherish
your step-child .... Even so, he may be losing certain benefits. A legal adoption may
[Vol. 18:136
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benefit of R.M.J, stated that,
Under R.M.J 's teaching lawyer advertising may be di-
vided into these categories: (1) inherently misleading or
proven to be misleading in practice, (2) potentially misleading
or (3) not misleading. The first category may warrant abso-
lute state prohibition. As to the second, the regulatory device,
as suggested in Bates, is not necessarily a total ban but rather
a required disclaimer or explanation. The restriction on po-
tentially misleading advertising may be no broader than rea-
sonably necessary to prevent specific deception. Regulation
of the third category must be justified by a showing of sub-
stantial state interest.3 4
In dismissing the disciplinary proceeding against Schaffer, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the advertisements were not mis-
leading and that the State had failed to show a substantial state interest
served by restriction of the advertisements.35 Thus, in Oklahoma,
"R.M.J gives a broad sweep of protection to the exercise of commer-
cial speech by lawyers."36
Because the Schaffer court did not deal directly with the constitu-
tionality of the Oklahoma Bar rules,37 and the advertising by Schaffer
differed from that by R.M.J., the total effect of kM.J on the
Oklahoma Code of Professional Responsibility is yet to be felt. A com-
parison of the Oklahoma and Missouri Codes reveals that several of
the Oklahoma provisions could be unconstitutional.
The Oklahoma Code expressly prohibits the inclusion in an adver-
tisement of areas of concentration and areas in which the firm does or
does not practice .3  These restrictions are more stringent than the Mis-
souri restrictions which the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional.3 9
give your step-child many of these benefits while telling your step-child you want him as
your very own."
Advertisement #2:
"Need a lawyer? 5 days-or free. Within 5 working days after you provide us with the
information we need, we will fie the necessary court documents, or if filing is not appro-
priate, begin providing legal services-or our services are free. Good for 30 days. DI-
VORCE NAME CHANGE WILLS INCORPORATION ADOPTION."
Id.
34. Id. at 1763.
35. Id. at 1764.
36. Id. at 1763.
37. Id. at 1765 n.8.
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. I, app. 3, DR 2-101(B)(8)(a)-(d), DR 2-105(4) (1981); see supra
note 4.
39. Compare Mo. ANN. RuLEs Rule 4 (Vernon 1981), which is quoted in note 3 supra, with
OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3 (1981), which is quoted in note 4 supra.
1982]
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Missouri allowed a firm the choice of indicating that it was in general
practice or of specifying any number of approved areas of concentra-
tion. The United States Supreme Court, in dealing with the listing of
areas of concentration, stated: "But the states may not place an abso-
lute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information,
e.g, a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive."40 Thus, it would seem that
Oklahoma's prohibition of the listing of areas of concentration is an
invalid restriction as long as the information and areas listed are not
deceptive.
Oklahoma does not expressly prohibit the listing in an advertise-
ment of the jurisdictions in which a lawyer is licensed to practice. Nor
does Oklahoma expressly allow such information to be contained in
any advertisement. The Court held in RM.J that "such information is
not misleading on its face."'" Thus, if this particular information is not
misleading in the context in which it is used, then it appears that
Oklahoma may not prohibit this type of information in an
advertisement.
The disciplinary rules relating to the mailing of professional an-
nouncements in Oklahoma are identical to those in Missouri.42 While
the Court was dealing with a silent record, the indication seemed to be
that this type of restriction on lawyer advertising is invalid since it is
not inherently misleading. However, the Court may have left the states
an opening to regulate this area; if a state can show that this type of
restriction is necessary to protect against misleading advertisements,
such announcements may be subject to regulation. The state would
have to prove that it had tried other methods and that they had failed.43
Oklahoma and the ABA are in the process of revising their adver-
tising regulations.' While Model Rules45 have been proposed for sev-
eral years, revision of the advertising portion of the current Code
would seem to be made imperative as a result of In re R.M..J To avoid
40. In re R.MJ., 102 S. Ct. at 937.
41. Id. at 938.
42. Compare Mo. ANN. RULES Rule 4, DR 2-102(A)(2) (Vernon 1981), which is quoted in
note 3 supra, with OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3, DR 2-102(A)(2) (1981), which is quoted in note
4 supra.
43. In re R1M.J., 102 S. Ct. at 939.
44. Telephone interview with Dean David Swank, Chairman, Oklahoma Lawyer Advertising
Committee (July 22, 1982).
45. For a discussion of the effects of the Model Rules on lawyer advertising, see Andrews,
The Model Rules andAdvertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 808 (1982).
[Vol. 18:136
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potential litigation in this area, the decision in RMJ must be consid-
ered to be an indication from the United States Supreme Court that
only misleading advertising may be regulated.
In rewriting the lawyer advertising regulations to conform to the
constitutional standard, the ABA and Oklahoma should consider a
more generalized type of regulation of permissible advertising, similar
to that of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility,46 as opposed
to the current "shopping list" of permissible advertising. This type of
regulation, drafted in accordance with the Supreme Court's language in
R.M.J, should reduce the need for future redrafting. Such drafting
would permit those lawyers who desire to advertise to do so, while al-
lowing the states to maintain some control over the advertising.
V. CONCLUSION
Controversy has already surfaced concerning the scope of .RM.J
Some have argued that the broad language of the Court will force all
states to rewrite their lawyer advertising rules so as to prohibit only
"misleading" advertisements.47 Others assert that the decision was a
narrow one in that it is limited to the specific facts with which the Court
dealt.48 The question as to What extent a lawyer may constitutionally
advertise remains unanswered. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court
46. 67 A.B.A. J. (Pullout Supplement, p. 28) (Oct. 1981). Rule 7.1 Communications Con-
cerning a Lawyer's Services
A Lawyer shall not make any false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary
to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the
rules of professional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the compari-
son can be factually substantiated.
47. Young, Lawyer advertising may not be restricted unless "misleading," 68 A.B.A. J. 342
(1982). "The Court's unanimous holding on January 25 that advertising by lawyers may be pro-
hibited only when it is misleading appears to have invalidated many state revisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that attempted to steer a course between prohibition of any ads by
lawyers and unlimited professional advertising." Id. at 342. See also Appleson, Lawyer AdDeci-
sion Raising More Questions, 68 A.B.A. J. 407 (1982).
The Supreme Court's ruling is nothing new, said Frank Easterbrook, professor at
University of Chicago Law School. "It's what the Supreme Court has been saying ever
since Bigelow [Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1973), in which the Court upheld the
constitutional right of commercial free speech]. How long will the ABA and others resist
what the Court is saying?"
Id. at 408.
48. Appleson, supra note 47, at 407.
10
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appears to interpret AM.J broadly,49 the specific areas addressed by
R.M.J need to be revised in the Oklahoma Code.
As the ABA and the states attempt to reconcile their regulations
with the Supreme Court decisions, the theoretical debate over lawyer
advertising continues. Even if advertising is constitutionally permissi-
ble, some lawyers will never advertise;"° others will exercise their full
constitutional rights. Since the decision inR.M..J has not answered the
question definitively, it is probable that this is not the Supreme Court's
last word on lawyer advertising. 51
Charles X Babb
49. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
50. See Stamper, supra note 8.
51. Andrews, supra note 6, at 49. "In an area as hotly debated as this one, the case of In re
JM may not be the Supreme Court's last word on lawyer advertising." Id.
11
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